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Germany



SUMMARY OF VISIT OF CHANCELLOR KONRAD ADENAUER TO
WASHINGTON ON MARCH 14-17, 1960

During Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Washington, he met formally with the President and with the Secretary of State and other officials of the Department of State. There were additional opportunities for further discussions at several social occasions.

The Joint Statement issued by the President and the Chancellor reflects accurately the range of subjects which the two discussed. As the Chancellor stated, the plebiscite proposal, which he raised in his speech at the National Press Club on March 16, was not discussed at his meeting with the President.

There was emphasis in all discussions on the question of Germany and Berlin and on problems related to the forthcoming Summit Conference. Throughout these conversations, the Chancellor emphasized as well his belief in the importance of securing agreement on effective disarmament proposals, and the President and the Chancellor agreed that this subject was of paramount importance as a topic for discussion in Paris.

Regarding Germany and Berlin, it was indicated by the President that the United States would not even discuss the possibility of the withdrawal of American troops from Europe until substantial progress had been made in achieving a workable disarmament

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disarmament program. It was also noted that we intended that the American flag would continue to fly over Berlin as long as present conditions prevailed and as long as no agreement acceptable to the populations of West Berlin and West Germany had been concluded.

At the meeting of the Chancellor with the Secretary, the question of allied and civilian access to Berlin was discussed. The Secretary expressed concern that the Soviets might tolerate Allied access but seek gradually to restrict civilian access. The Germans stated their viewpoint that the 1949 New York and Paris agreements confirmed the right of civilian access. This was therefore to be regarded as nonnegotiable as were Allied rights of access.

There was limited discussion of Summit tactics, and the Secretary noted that if the Berlin issue arose, discussions would be picked up from the beginning and not the end of the Geneva meetings. He noted that the U.S. position had not weakened. The Secretary and the Chancellor agreed that there was a great urgency to establish a firm and united Western position on Berlin prior to the May 16 Summit Conference. The emphasis given by the President and the Chancellor to disarmament as an item of paramount importance for discussions at Berlin was noted. It was observed that the coming weeks should

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make it easier to assess the seriousness of Soviet intentions in this area.

In connection with discussions of disarmament, it was noted by the President and the Chancellor that the West can effectively bring about disarmament only from a position of strength, and that only if we are strong will the Soviets understand what the situation really is. In effect, we must arm to be able to bring about disarmament.

During his visit to Washington, the Chancellor discussed with the President, the Secretary, and other officials a number of subjects essentially of a bilateral nature, as indicated in the Joint Statement.

Regarding aid to underdeveloped countries, the President and other U.S. officials noted the necessity for increased Western efforts in this area to combat the actions of the Communist dictatorship. In this connection, the Chancellor noted that one of the real problems was not necessarily an increased Western effort, but a better-organized and better-coordinated effort. He made particular reference to the need for propaganda by the West and the United States--to let the world know what it is doing already. As an example, the Chancellor noted that the 1960 U.S. budget contains more funds for underdeveloped countries for one year than Khrushchev has even promised over many years.

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It was felt that the Atlantic Community should be strengthened in order to counteract the efforts of the Soviet Union to become a decisive economic power.

As to the Chancellor's plebiscite proposal, we assume that further details on this will be introduced into the current Summit preparatory talks.

March 18, 1960

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